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The Special Joint Committee on the 
Constitution of Canada, 1980-81 
Peter W. Hogg and Annika Wang* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The patriation of the Canadian Constitution and the entrenchment of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 in 1982 are, in some ways, the 
story of one man and one party. The constitutional package was drafted by 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s Liberals and approved by two Houses both 
controlled by the Liberals. The project was marked by Liberal control  
pitted against Conservative (and sometimes NDP) resistance, political 
gamesmanship, and partisan acrimony. But there is at least one chapter in 
this story where the Liberals lost their grip on the narrative, the parties set 
aside petty partisanship, and the Canadian public became the author of its 
own history. For three months in 1980 and 1981, a Special Joint Committee 
of the House and Senate provided a platform for the voices of hundreds of 
individuals and organizations that represented an extraordinarily diverse 
cross-section of Canadian society. For the first time in Canadian history, 
television shined the spotlight on a committee’s work and captured the 
attention of the nation. The engagement of the broader public, combined 
with the ideas and passions of the witnesses who spoke to the Committee, 
softened a process that would otherwise have been partisan, and the end 
result was a stronger Charter of Rights. 
The Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada, 1980-81 
was conceived as a Liberal strategy to shield the party from criticism 
from its political opponents: the hope was that a bipartisan committee 
would expedite the process. The Conservatives initially hoped that they 
could use the Committee to obstruct the process in an attempt to shame 
the Liberals into delaying their plans and negotiating with their 
                                                                                                                       
* Peter W. Hogg, Scholar in Residence, Blake Cassels & Graydon LLP; Professor 
Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. 
 Annika Wang, Associate, Blake Cassels & Graydon LLP. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),  
1982, c. 11. 
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opponents. In the end, both parties lost control of the narrative and the 
Committee took on a life of its own. Unprecedented public attention 
forced a détente that led both these parties and the NDP to come together 
to create a stronger Charter. Although it would take another year before 
the Constitution would be brought home to Canada, the draft of the 
Charter that emerged from the Committee would remain largely in place.  
The purpose of this article is to explore this obscure yet significant 
step in the drafting of the Charter and the patriation of the Constitution. 
To that end, this article will describe the history and proceedings of the 
Committee, focusing on how Liberal and Conservative strategies shaped 
its formation; the recommendations made by the Committee, showcasing 
how all three parties made substantive contributions with an eye to 
strengthening the Charter; and the development of non-partisanship on 
the Committee, made all the more remarkable by the bitter partisanship 
that had characterized the process before the Committee went to work. 
II. ORIGINS OF THE COMMITTEE 
On October 6, 1980, the Prime Minister Trudeau’s government moved 
in the House of Commons the motion for the establishment of a special 
joint committee, as follows: 
That a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons 
be appointed to consider and report upon the document entitled “Proposed 
Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen respecting the 
Constitution of Canada” published by the government on October 2, 1980, 
and to recommend in their report whether or not such an address, with such 
amendments as the committee considers necessary, should be presented by 
both Houses of Parliament to Her Majesty the Queen.2  
Notice of the motion had been published on October 2, 1980, which was 
the first time that the government had made the constitutional package 
contained in the Resolution public.3 Prior to that date, the constitutional 
package had only been made available to provincial and federal officials in 
the course of discussions between the two levels of government.4  
                                                                                                                       
2 House of Commons Debates, 32nd Parl., 1st Sess., No. 3 (October 6, 1980), at 3274 
[hereinafter “House Debates No. 3”]. 
3 Roy Romanow, John Whyte & Howard Leeson, Canada…Notwithstanding: The Making 
of the Constitution 1976-1982 (Agincourt, ON: Carswell/Methuen, 1984), at 248 [hereinafter 
“Romanow, Whyte & Leeson”]. 
4 This is not to say that there were no public antecedents to the Charter prior to this date. 
The October 6, 1980 draft of the Charter took inspiration from many sources, including 
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On September 8-13, 1980, Prime Minister Trudeau and the provincial 
Premiers met at a First Ministers’ Conference to negotiate the proposed 
constitutional package, including an entrenched Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms drafted by the Trudeau government. The Conference was the 
capstone to an intensive summer of private negotiations between federal 
and provincial government officials. The Conference failed to reach 
agreement on the package.5 On September 17, 1980, Trudeau gathered 
his caucus to contemplate their next step. Though he warned them that 
unilateral patriation would be “the fight of our lives”, the caucus agreed.  
Having decided by September 17, 1980 to act unilaterally, it is not 
altogether clear why the Trudeau government chose to establish a special 
joint committee. Some scholars argue, and perhaps this is the better view, 
that the Liberals used the committee as a “Machiavellian power play” to 
lend legitimacy to their unilateral action and shield themselves from 
criticism by the provinces.6 Others argue that the Progressive 
Conservatives, the official opposition, had forced the Liberals’ hand in an 
attempt to delay and obstruct the passing of the Resolution.7 
The New Democratic Party (“NDP”) was on-board with the Liberals. 
Although some members expressed regret that the government was 
acting unilaterally,8 Ed Broadbent, leader of the NDP, accepted the 
                                                                                                                       
Diefenbaker’s Bill of Rights, Trudeau’s paper “A Canadian Charter of Human Rights” from 1968, 
and the failed Bill C-60 from 1978, among others. See Roger Tassé, A Life in the Law – The 
Constitution and Much More, translated by Jack MacDonald (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2013), at 
192-194 [hereinafter “Tassé”]. 
5 “Highlights of the Kirby Memorandum” (August 30, 1980), online: <http://faculty. 
marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/docs/1982/17.htm> [hereinafter “Kirby Memorandum”]; 
Tassé, supra, note 4, at 211-212, 239. 
6 See Adam Dodek, “Where Did (Section) 1 Come From? The Debates over the 
Limitations Clause at the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the 
Constitution, 1980-81” (2010) 27 NJCL 77, at 81-82: “By one account, the establishment of the Joint 
Committee was a Machiavellian power play by the federal government to strengthen its hand against 
the recalcitrant provinces”.  
 And see Christopher Page, The Rules of Public Opinion Research in Canadian 
Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), at 89: “With federal-provincial 
negotiations stalled, the federal government laid the groundwork for acting unilaterally, and in 
October 1980 it established a joint parliamentary committee to help legitimate the action”. 
7 See Lorraine Weinrib, “The Canadian Charter’s Override Clause: Lessons for Israel” 
(2016) 49 Israel L.R. at 76: “The federal Conservative Party turned to the national Parliament to 
further obstruct Trudeau’s plans, insisting upon the creation of a Special Joint Committee of the 
national Parliament to consider the draft text of the Charter. Trudeau reluctantly complied”.  
 And see Romanow, Whyte & Leeson, supra, note 3, at 247: “Largely through the efforts 
of the Conservatives, the government was forced to support the establishment of a Joint 
Parliamentary Committee to consider the report on the proposed resolution”. 
8 For example, House of Commons Debates, 32nd Parl., 1st Sess., No. 4 (October 15, 
1980), at 3709 (Bill Blaikie) [hereinafter “House Debates No. 4”]. 
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Liberals’ timeline as having been established in good faith and affirmed 
his party’s support for the substance of the Resolution.9 The support of 
the NDP was crucial to the Liberals’ sense of legitimacy, as the NDP and 
Conservatives controlled the West, where the Liberals had failed to 
secure a single seat.10 
With the Liberals commanding a majority in both Houses, the 
Conservatives’ only option was to delay the Resolution and increase 
public and press scrutiny, thereby pressuring the Liberals into returning 
to the negotiating table with the provinces. For two weeks, the 
Conservatives attempted to filibuster the motion. Then on October 22, 
1980, the Liberals moved for closure, a rarely-used procedural device 
that brings a debate to a close. On October 23, the final day of debate, an 
explosive argument ensued in the early hours of the morning as the 
Speaker attempted to call the vote for the motion to establish the 
committee. Members angrily demanded the right to be heard, engaged in 
shouting matches, and accused the Liberals of acting like Nazis.11 The 
final vote took place at 2:00 a.m. on October 24, 1980, and the motion 
was carried 156 to 83.12 
The Senate began its deliberation on October 27, 1980. Several 
senators expressed concern regarding the entrenchment of the Charter in 
the Constitution, arguing that it would force impartial courts to wade into 
the political arena and expand judicial power over traditional domains of 
Parliament.13 Another frequent concern was the Liberals’ decision to seek 
permission from Westminster, which some senators argued was 
unacceptably reminiscent of the country’s colonial past.14 The Honorable 
Jacques Flynn, Leader of the Opposition, repeated the House 
Conservatives’ concern that the constitutional package was being pushed 
                                                                                                                       
9 House Debates No. 3, supra, note 2 (October 6, 1980), at 3297, 3299 (Ed Broadbent): “If you 
[Prime Minister Trudeau] say there is a mood in the country that we ought to deal with it now, then I say, 
with respect, to the Leader of the Opposition that we have to act now.… [T]here is much in this proposal 
that is attractive to us, not because it comes from a Liberal Prime Minister but because it reflects 
resolutions and motions passed by my party over the years. If the government will show flexibility in 
committee and accept some amendments, we can have a decent piece of legislation”. 
10 Natural Resources Canada, “Results of the 32nd Federal Election, February 18, 1980”, online: 
<http://geogratis.gc.ca/api/en/nrcan-rncan/ess-sst/15629d81-5020-5932-957f-afda9befa669.html>. 
11 Robert Sheppard & Michael Valpy, The National Deal: The Fight for a Canadian 
Constitution (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984), at 138; and Hansard, 4050-4051. 
12 House Debates No. 4, supra, note 8 (October 23, 1980), at 4052-4053. 
13 See, for example: Debates of the Senate, 32nd Parl, 1st Sess., No. 1 (October 28, 1980), at 
991-992 (Senator Walker) and at 1031 (Senator Nurgitz) [hereinafter “Senate Debates No. 1”]. 
14 See, for example: Id. (October 29, 1980), at 1020 (Hon Duff Roblin); (October 30, 1980), 
at 1070 (Senator Wood) and at 1078 (Senator Donahue). 
(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE 7 
too quickly and with too little consultation, and accused the Liberals of 
plotting the failure at the September Conference so that they could move 
ahead unilaterally.15 Nevertheless, after six days of debate, the motion 
carried in a vote of 45 to 29.16 
Thus, the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada  
was born. 
III. PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE 
1. Composition 
The Committee was composed of 15 MPs and 10 Senators, along the 
following party divisions: eight Liberals, five Conservatives and two NDPs 
from the House; and seven Liberals and three Conservatives from the 
Senate. This reflected the composition of the House and Senate at the 
time.17 Twelve members could form a quorum (in effect giving the Liberals 
a veto, should they vote as a bloc). MP Serge Joyal and Senator Harry Hays 
(both Liberals) were chosen by the Committee as co-chairmen.  
2. Work of the Committee 
The Committee met 106 times over 56 sitting days, from November 6, 
1980 to February 9, 1981, spanning a total of 267 hours. Advertisements 
were published in major newspapers to invite the public to submit written 
briefs; from these submissions, the Committee chose who to invite to make 
oral presentations. The Committee received briefs, telegrams and letters 
from 914 individuals and 294 groups,18 and heard oral presentations from 
104 individuals and groups, four Premiers (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan), and representatives of two 
territories (Yukon and Northwest Territories). The vast majority of the 
                                                                                                                       
15 Id. (October 27, 1980), at 967-972 (Hon. Jacques Flynn). 
16 Id. (November 3, 1980), at 1147. 
17 The composition of the House as at September 30, 1980 was 145 Liberals, 102 
Conservatives and 32 NDPs; and the composition of the Senate as at October 25, 1980 was 64 
Liberals, 26 Conservatives, 0 NDPs, and four others. See: Library of Parliament, “Party Standings 
(1867 to Date)”, online: <http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/lists/PartyStandingsHistoric.aspx?>.  
18 The Senate and House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special 
Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada 
(February 13, 1981) at 57:5 [hereinafter “Committee”]. 
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briefs and presentations addressed the Charter, which quickly became the 
central focus of the Committee’s work. 
The stages of the Committee were as follows:  
Dates Committee Actions 
November 6, 1980 Discussion of procedural rules. 
November 7-13, 1980 Presentations and questioning of Minister of 
Justice Jean Chrétien, Deputy Minister of Justice 
Roger Tassé, and Assistant Deputy Minister of 
Justice Barry Strayer. 
November 14, 1980-
January 9, 1981 




Clause-by-clause consideration of the Resolution, 
including questioning of Chrétien, Tassé and 
Strayer. 
3. Televising the Proceedings 
Broadcasting of committee proceedings had been legal since 1977, but 
no committee as yet had its proceedings broadcast.19 The Liberals were 
initially not keen to make this committee the first. The Conservatives, 
supported by the NDP, in the House pushed repeatedly for broadcasting — 
a debate one Conservative MP described as a “tremendous” battle.20 
The Liberals’ position began to falter by November 12, 1980, when 
Trudeau indicated that, after private discussions with his cabinet, the 
Liberals were willing to meet the House leaders of the other parties to 
negotiate the matter.21 On November 13, 1980, the Liberals moved in the 
House and the Senate to introduce television to the Committee’s 
proceedings.22 On November 17, 1980, the Committee became the first 
in Canadian history to have its proceedings broadcast to the public.23 
                                                                                                                       
19 Library of Parliament, Television and the House of Commons, BP-242E (2005), at 8, online: 
Library of Parliament <http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/bp242-e.pdf>. 
20 House Debates, 32nd Parl., 1st Sess., No. 7 (March 4, 1981), at 7904 (John Fraser) 
[hereinafter “House Debates No. 7”]. 
21 Id. (November 12, 1980), at 4583 (Pierre Trudeau). 
22 Id. (November 13, 1980), at 4647-4648; and Senate Debates No. 1, supra, note 13 
(November 13, 1980), at 1226. 
23 Committee, supra, note 18 (February 13, 1981), at 57:4. 
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4. Timeline 
A second battle concerned the timeline for the Committee to complete 
its work. The Liberals had hoped that the Committee would submit its 
report by December 9, 1980—just over a month from the date of its first 
meeting. However, after pressure from the Conservatives and NDP the 
Committee extended the deadline to February 13, 1981. 
5. Public Input 
Thanks to television coverage and the prolonged timeline, the 
Committee’s work captured the public’s attention, reaching over three 
million people and generating widespread enthusiasm for a stronger 
Charter.24 This public engagement was due largely to pressure from the 
Conservatives, as part of their strategy to delay and publicize the 
government’s actions. There was always a risk that this strategy could 
backfire, and that seemed to be exactly what happened. Rather than 
stoking public outrage against the Liberals’ disregard for federalism, the 
work of the Committee garnered strong public support and lent credence 
to the Liberals’ portrayal of the recalcitrant provinces as power-hungry 
nay-sayers. Strayer would later say that this public support ultimately 
allowed the Liberals to realize their original vision for a strong Charter 
rather than the diluted one that they had been forced to table in October 
1980 as a result of provincial compromise.25 All this is not to say that the 
Conservative strategy was a complete failure — although they continued 
to push for provincial participation even to the very end, increasing 
public engagement and consultation should have been as much an end of 
itself as a means, and in that they were undoubtedly successful.  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE 
In response to suggestions made by various individuals and groups 
before the Committee, the Department of Justice tabled an amended draft 
of the Resolution before the Committee on January 12, 1981, the first 
day of the Committee’s clause-by-clause consideration. The Committee 
then analyzed the amended draft and made further recommendations, 
                                                                                                                       
24 House Debates No. 7, supra, note 20 (February 19, 1981), at 7471-2 (Serge Joyal). 
25 Barry Strayer, Canada’s Constitutional Revolution (Edmonton: The University of Alberta 
Press, 2013), at 252. 
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which it submitted in its report dated February 13, 1981. Below is a 
review of certain significant amendments. 
1. Limitation Clause (Section 1) 
Section 1 underwent numerous changes from its first draft dated 
August 22, 1980 to the final version we know today. The first draft was 
presented by the Liberal government to the provincial Premiers on 
August 22, 1980.26 The Premiers proposed an amended version on 
August 29, 1980 that, in their opinion, was more respectful of 
parliamentary supremacy. The draft that survived in the October 6, 1980 
Resolution partly reflected their wishes. 
August 22, 1980 draft August 29, 1980 draft October 6, 1980 draft 
The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and 
Freedoms recognizes 
the following rights 
and freedoms subject 
only to such 
reasonable limits as 
are generally accepted 
in a free and 
democratic society. 
The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms 
recognizes the following 
rights and freedoms 
subject only to such 
reasonable limits as are 
generally accepted in a 
free society living under 
a parliamentary 
democracy. 
The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms 
recognizes the 
following rights and 
freedoms subject only 
to such reasonable 
limits as are generally 
accepted in a free and 
democratic society with 
a parliamentary system 
of government. 
More than any other section, section 1 was the target of virulent 
criticism by human rights groups. Gordon Fairweather, Chief 
Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, called 
section 1 “seriously flawed” and entreated the members of the 
Committee “not to let this bill into Parliament with Section 1 in its 
present form”.27 The Canadian Bar Association proposed the complete 
elimination of section 1, fearing that “it might destroy the entire purpose” 
of the Charter.28 The National Action Committee on the Status of Women  
 
                                                                                                                       
26 Strayer, id., at 252-255. 
27 Committee, supra, note 18 (November 14, 1980), at 5:24. 
28 Id. (November 28, 1980), at 15:7. 
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famously dubbed section 1 “the Mack truck clause” for being so broad as 
to allow a Mack truck to drive right through the Charter.29 In total, 46 
groups and 26 individuals made written submissions on section 1, with 
38 groups and 17 individuals rejecting it.30 
The central fear of human rights groups was that any legislation 
passed by Parliament would be “generally accepted”, since Parliament is 
the representative of the people. As Fairweather argued before the 
Committee, both the internment of Japanese Canadians during WWII and 
the Chinese head tax were generally considered acceptable at the time 
they were passed.31  
Minister Chrétien, responding to the outpouring of criticism, agreed 
to adopt an amendment (January 12, 1981) similar to the ones proposed 
by the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association.  
Comparison between October 6, 1980 and January 12, 1981 drafts 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits as are 
generally acceptedprescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society with a parliamentary system of government. 
Section 1 was thus adopted by the Committee without further 
amendment, and remained the same into the final draft. 
2. Property Rights (Section 7) 
Section 7 was ultimately adopted into the Charter unchanged from the 
October 6, 1980 draft, but it bears noting the partisan controversy that the 
fight over property rights stirred in the Committee. Citing the need to 
protect the “family farm, family business and family home”, 
Conservative MP Perrin Beatty moved to add property rights into section 7, 
as follows: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and 
enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
The NDP protested what they saw as the inappropriate addition of 
economic rights designed to protect large corporations in a Charter meant 
                                                                                                                       
29 Id. (November 20, 1980), at 9:58. 
30 Id. (February 13, 1981), at 57:94. 
31 Id. (November 14, 1980), at 5:12. 
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to protect individual freedoms.32 MP Svend Robinson asked why the 
right to property should supersede other economic and social rights, like 
the right to clean air and the environment. Backed by submissions  
from the Canadian Bar Association and Professor Tarnopolsky (a member 
of the United Nations Human Rights Commission), Robinson argued that 
entrenched property rights could have unintended consequences, such as 
prohibiting the collection of taxes.33 Robinson further lambasted the 
Conservatives as hypocrites for attempting to “ram” the provision “down 
the throats of provincial governments”, which hold jurisdiction over 
property rights under the Constitution. 
The Liberals initially appeared sympathetic to the addition of property 
rights to section 7, but eventually Minister Chrétien, who had been 
absent during an illness, returned to the Committee and insisted that the 
Liberals could support no such addition, on the basis that the provinces 
had vehemently rejected the idea.34  
Without evidence either way, it is impossible to say for certain whether 
the Liberals’ abandonment of entrenched property rights was motivated by 
concern for provincial rights, NDP support, or the testimony of groups like 
the Canadian Bar Association. Though the motive may be unclear, the 
outcome was the exclusion of property rights from the Charter.35 
3. Legal Rights (Sections 7-14) 
A number of important changes were made in the January 12, 1981 
draft of sections 7-14, again directly reflective of testimony from various 
groups and individuals before the Committee. In summary, some of the 
most important ones were:  
1. the removal of the qualifier “except on grounds, and in accordance 
with procedures, established by law” from sections 8, 9, and 11(e). 
The qualifier, which is a standard of “legality”, was replaced with the 
standard “unreasonable” in section 8, “arbitrarily” in section 9, and 
“without just cause” in section 11(e); 
2. the addition of the right to be informed of one’s right to retain 
counsel in section 11(b); 
                                                                                                                       
32 Id. (January 23, 1981), at 44:17-22. 
33 Id., at 44:27-28. 
34 Id. (January 26, 1981), at 45:9-10. See also Tassé, supra, note 4, at 204. 
35 The Conservatives’ motion to add property rights was defeated 15-8, by 13 Liberals and 
two NDPs against eight Conservatives (Committee, supra, note 18 (January 27, 1981), at 46:4-5).  
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3. the addition of the right not to be compelled as a witness against 
oneself in section 11(c);  
4. the addition of the right to a trial by jury for offences with a 
maximum punishment of five or more years in section 11(f); and 
5. the addition of the right not to have voluntarily-given evidence be 
used to incriminate oneself in subsequent proceedings in section 13. 
It is worth noting that, despite the animosity between the 
Conservatives and NDP as a result of the fight over property rights, the 
two parties became aligned against the Liberals on two interesting 
matters regarding legal rights to which the Committee turned its mind: 
the deportation of non-citizens and the right to legal aid. 
The Conservatives, supported by the NDP, moved to add protection 
against arbitrary deportation to section 9. Minister Chrétien opposed the 
motion on the basis that Canadian citizens were already protected against 
removal from the country by section 6(1) (mobility rights), and the 
government didn’t want to be entangled in years of court battles for 
deporting illegal aliens.36 The Conservatives protested that protection 
against “arbitrary” deportation is a low standard which even illegal aliens 
should be afforded, and that such a standard would not impact the normal 
course of the immigration department’s work of legally deporting aliens.37 
The Conservatives and NDP then pressed Chrétien on two issues. First, 
they argued that section 6(1) does not protect landed immigrants from 
deportation. Chrétien first countered that section 6(1) would protect landed 
immigrants, then changed course by claiming that landed immigrants 
would be protected by the Immigration Act.38 Second, the Conservatives 
and NDP recalled the denationalization and internment of Japanese-
Canadians during WWII, and argued that the Charter as drafted would not 
protect Canadian citizens from being first denationalized and then deported. 
Chrétien first responded that denationalization would be illegal, and then 
argued that denationalized citizens could bring a case under sections 1 and 
6(1) to protest their denationalization.39 The motion was ultimately voted 
down along party lines (10-14), with the end result being that the right 
against arbitrary deportation for both legal immigrants and illegal aliens 
was not entrenched in the Charter.40 
                                                                                                                       
36 Committee, supra, note 18 (January 27, 1981), at 46:111-113. 
37 Id., at 46:112. 
38 Id., at 46:115-116.  
39 Id., at 46:119-122. 
40 Id., at 46:111-124. 
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The NDP, supported by the Conservatives, moved to add the right  
to retain counsel regardless of financial circumstance to section 10.  
Mr. Robinson argued that, for those who could not afford to hire counsel, the  
right to retain counsel was “a hollow right”. “If this is to be a Charter for all 
people in Canada and not just for those who can afford to retain a lawyer”, 
Mr. Robinson argued, “if there is to be any justice for the poor”, then the right 
to retain counsel cannot be discriminatorily applied based on wealth.41 
Liberal MP Jean Lapierre responded that determining the eligibility criteria 
for legal aid would be an intrusion into provincial rights, and that the current 
system of legal aid was sufficient.42 At the least, the Conservatives felt, there 
should be a right to be informed that one has the right to access legal aid. 
Chrétien responded that it was inappropriate for the Charter to direct provinces 
on how to administer legal aid.43 Liberal Senator Jack Austin, seemingly torn, 
equivocated that “there must surely come a time, I do not believe it is at this 
moment, but surely there is a time in the constitutional amendment process 
when this particular provision must be implemented by our successors”.44 
The motion was defeated 9-13 along party lines, and the phrase “regardless of 
financial circumstances” was never added to the right to counsel.  
4. Equality Rights (Section 15) 
Changing the prohibited grounds of discrimination from a closed-off 
list to an open-ended one was the most significant change to section 15 
in the January 12, 1981 draft. 
Comparison between October 6, 1980 and January 12, 1981 drafts 
(1) Everyone has the right to equality Every individual is equal before 
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and 
equal benefit of the law without discrimination because ofand, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, age or sex or age. 
(2) This sectionSubsection (1) does not preclude any law, program 
or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions 
of disadvantaged persons or groupsindividuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex or age. 
                                                                                                                       
41 Id., at 46:134. 
42 Id., at 46:129. 
43 Id., at 46:131. 
44 Id., at 46:133. 
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This was a change that had been recommended by the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission, as well as other witnesses, and a welcome 
one that passed without much debate in the Committee.  
The only subsequent addition by the Committee was “mental or 
physical disability” to the enumerated grounds, which the Conservatives 
and NDP supported but which the Liberals had initially resisted. Though 
Minister Chrétien felt that disability would be captured by the open-ended 
list, he expressed hesitation in enumerating grounds that were “in the 
process of maturing”.45 Whereas grounds of discrimination based, for 
instance, on race and sex were well-established and “mature”, other 
grounds had yet to reach that stage. But, by the time that the Committee 
had reached section 15 in its clause-by-clause consideration, Mr. Chrétien 
had apparently changed his mind and the Conservative motion to add 
“mental or physical disability” passed unanimously without debate.46  
The NDP attempted to expand the list of enumerated grounds further 
to include marital status, sexual orientation and political beliefs, as 
suggested by the National Action Committee on the Status of Women 
(“NAC”), but these were roundly rejected by the Conservatives and 
Liberals for being either too vague or unnecessary.47 Conservative MP 
Jake Epp groused that the NDP was trying “to hang every barnacle and 
every eavestrough and every coat of paint” on the Charter.48 
Women’s groups, led by NAC, had unsuccessfully pushed for a  
two-tiered section 15, which would provide that enumerated grounds of 
discrimination (which are based on “immutable characteristics”) would 
never be subject to “reasonable limits” or “reasonable distinctions”, while 
all other grounds would be subject to such limits. The desire for an 
untouchable tier arose out of a deep sense of distrust of and disappointment 
with the courts, which had for years interpreted non-discrimination 
provisions detrimentally to women. There is some suggestion that this 
initiative was ultimately defeated because of the enumerated ground of 
“age”.49 Neither women’s groups nor the Department of Justice felt it 
appropriate to delete “age” from the enumerated list, yet some legislation 
must necessarily make distinctions based on age. 
The recommendation of the Committee on section 15 was ultimately 
adopted into the final draft unchanged. 
                                                                                                                       
45 Id. (January 12, 1981), at 36:30-31. 
46 Id. (January 28, 1981), at 47:90-91. 
47 Id. (January 29, 1981), at 48:34. 
48 Id. (January 29, 1981), at 48:32. 
49 Romanow, Whyte & Leeson, supra, note 3, at 254-255. 
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5. Enforcement (Section 24) 
October 6, 1980 draft January 12, 1981 draft February 13, 1981 
Committee’s 
recommendation 
25. Any law that is 
inconsistent with the 
provisions of this 
Charter is, to the 
extent of such 
inconsistency, 
inoperative and of no 
force or effect. 
26. No provision of 
this Charter, other 
than section 13, 
affects the laws 
respecting the 
admissibility of 
evidence in any 
proceedings or the 
authority of 
Parliament or a 
legislature to make 
laws in relation 
thereto. 
24. Anyone whose 
rights or freedoms, as 
guaranteed by this 
Charter, have been 
infringed or denied may 
apply to a court of 
competent jurisdiction 
to obtain such remedy 
as the court considers 
appropriate and just in 
the circumstances. 
24. (1) Anyone whose 
rights or freedoms, as 
guaranteed by this 
Charter, have been 
infringed or denied may 
apply to a court of 
competent jurisdiction 
to obtain such remedy 
as the court considers 
appropriate and just in 
the circumstances. 
(2) Where, in 
proceedings under 
subsection (1), a court 
concludes that evidence 
was obtained in a 
manner that infringed or 
denied any rights or 
freedoms guaranteed by 
this Charter, the 
evidence shall be 
excluded if it is 
established that, having 
regard to all the 
circumstances, the 
admission of it in the 
proceedings would 
bring the administration 
of justice unto 
disrepute. 
Section 24, the enforcement and remedy provision, was not included 
in the October 6, 1980 draft. Section 25 of that draft, known as the  
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“primacy of the Charter” clause, was removed and replaced by section 24 
of the January 12, 1981 draft, which would eventually become section 
24(1) of the final draft. With respect to the admissibility of evidence, the 
October 6, 1980 draft contained a provision that the Charter could not 
affect laws “respecting the admissibility of evidence in any proceedings”, 
which was presumably an olive branch to the provinces. In the face of 
criticism from groups including the Canadian Civil Liberties Association 
and the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the January 12, 1981 draft 
dropped this provision. Section 24(2), the evidentiary remedy provision, 
was added by a Liberal motion in the Committee. Following the 
recommendation of the NDP, the Liberal motion to add 24(2) was 
amended by replacing the permissive “may” with the mandatory “shall”, 
which obligates courts to exclude evidence whose admission would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. Aside from a minor 
grammatical change in section 24(2), section 24 carried into the final 
draft unchanged from the Committee’s recommendation. 
6. Aboriginal Rights (Sections 25, 35) 
Aboriginal rights were conspicuously missing from the October 6, 
1980 draft, aside from a brief mention in section 24 (undeclared rights) 
that the Charter should not be construed as denying the existence of 
any undeclared rights, “including any rights or freedoms that pertain to 
the native peoples of Canada”. Prime Minister Trudeau indicated that 
section 24 was intended as a negative safeguard for Aboriginal rights, 
and that the entrenchment of positive rights would be an item of 
priority in the next phase of constitutional amendment after patriation 
was complete.50 The reasoning for delaying work on Aboriginal rights 
appeared to be that the Liberals wanted more time to achieve 
consensus among disparate Aboriginal groups over the definition of 
Aboriginal rights. However, Aboriginal groups protested that the 
government had shown little initiative in actuating this worthwhile 
goal.51 The Native Council of Canada (“NCC”) also pointed out, 
despite the government’s ostensible optimism that entrenching 
                                                                                                                       
50 House Debates No. 4, supra, note 8 (October 17, 1980), at 3778 (Pierre Trudeau); Committee, 
supra, note 18 (December 2, 1980), at 17:8 (quoting a letter from Trudeau to Aboriginal groups). 
51 See, for example, National Indian Brotherhood, “Brief of the National Indian 
Brotherhood” (November 11, 1980), at 8, online: History of Rights <http://historyofrights.ca/wp-
content/uploads/committee/nib.pdf>; and Committee, supra, note 18 (December 2, 1980) 17:107-
109 (presentation of the Native Council of Canada). 
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Aboriginal rights “will become easier rather than harder” after 
patriation,52 the Kirby Memorandum had been starkly forthright that 
“[e]ntrenching [native] rights will be enormously difficult after 
patriation”.53 The NDP led the charge in the House against the 
government for relegating Aboriginal rights to an afterthought in the 
constitutional amendment process.54  
The Committee heard from 37 witnesses recommending the 
entrenchment of Aboriginal rights, including 16 or 17 that represented 
Aboriginal peoples.55 Witnesses asked for, among other things, 
positive recognition of Aboriginal rights, treaty rights, right to self-
government, and rights created by the Royal Proclamation of 1763; 
and a participatory role for Aboriginals in the amending formula on 
issues pertaining to them.56 The three largest national Aboriginal 
groups (the NCC, the National Indian Brotherhood (“NIB”), and the 
Inuit Committee on National Issues (“ICNI”)) aligned on all these 
recommendations.57 
Aboriginal groups continued their lobbying efforts, including the 
dispatch of a “constitutional train” that carried Aboriginal delegates 
thousands of miles from across the country to speak to the prime 
minister on November 28, 1980.58 In mid-January, Mr. Broadbent 
informed Prime Minister Trudeau in private that the NDP might 
withdraw their support unless the government moved on the issue of 
Aboriginal rights.59 By January 30, 1981, the government had reached 
an agreement with the NIB, the NCC and the ICNI60 on a rephrased 
section 24 (now section 25) that makes explicit reference to the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, as well as the introduction of a new section 33 
(now section 35) affirming Aboriginal and treaty rights. The amendments 
                                                                                                                       
52 House Debates No. 4, supra, note 8 (November 13, 1980), at 4688 (Jim Manly, quoting a 
letter from Trudeau to Aboriginal groups). 
53 Committee, supra, note 18 (December 2, 1980), at 17:111; House Debates No. 5, infra, 
note 58 (November 20, 1980), at 4912 (Lorne Greenaway, quoting the Kirby Memorandum). 
54 See, for example: House Debates No. 4, supra, note 8 (October 21, 1980), at 3888-3890 
(Peter Ittinuar). 
55 Committee, supra, note 18 (January 30, 1981), at 49:90. 
56 See, for example: National Indian Brotherhood, supra, note 51, at 14-15. 
57 Committee, supra, note 18 (December 2, 1980), at 17:116; National Indian Brotherhood, 
supra, note 51, at appendix p.1-7. 
58 House Debates No. 5 (November 28, 1980), at 5146 (F. Oberle) and (December 1, 1980), 
at 5185 (Albert Cooper and Ed Broadbent).  
59 Tassé, supra, note 4, at 261. 
60 Committee, supra, note 18 (January 30, 1980), at 49:88-89 (the text refers to the “Inuit 
Tapirisat of Canada”, which is the organizing force behind the ICNI). 
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were introduced on behalf of the government by NDP MP Peter 
Ittinuar, the first Inuk MP, and were approved unanimously.61  
V. PARTISANSHIP IN THE COMMITTEE 
One remarkable characteristic of the Committee was the level of non-
partisanship displayed by its members. This was particularly striking given 
that the debate in the House of Commons had been ludicrously partisan. 
Conservative members had invoked Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union to 
describe the Liberals’ actions; Prime Minister Trudeau had variously been 
called a “dictator”, a “fanatic”, and even “Hitler”.62 The Conservatives 
came into the Committee unsure whether they even wanted to participate. 
Conservative MP James McGrath expressed to the Liberals in no uncertain 
terms that the Resolution would remain “totally unacceptable to us, despite 
any improvements which might be made”.63 Yet, despite the discouraging 
words, the Conservatives never acted to obstruct the clause-by-clause 
deliberations on the Committee. All three parties put forward proposals  
to improve and expand the Charter, often recalling and championing  
the suggestions that had been made by the witnesses that had appeared 
before them.  
The members of the Committee expressed gratitude and gratification at 
the collegiality on the Committee. Mr. McGrath, perhaps the foremost 
agitator on the Committee, proclaimed that he was “touched by the degree 
of collegiality and the spirit of cooperation that had developed in this 
Committee”. He praised the “cooperation and the fellowship” of the 
members, calling it one of the most outstanding experiences of his political 
career. NDP MP Lorne Nystrom contrasted his frustration with party 
discipline in the House, which rendered individual members into mere 
“rubber stamps for party establishments”. He hoped that the Committee 
could be the start of “a new chapter in the evolution” of Parliament.  
This is not to say that the Committee was a haven of co-operation in 
which party politics never played a role. Noticeably, the voting patterns 
were often along party lines. The Liberals made 58 motions and all 58 
were approved; the Conservatives made 22 and seven were approved; 
and the NDP made 43 and two were approved. The greatest strain on the 
                                                                                                                       
61 Id., at 49:9-10. Lest this account leave the reader with the impression of complete 
consensus, it bears mention, though it is beyond the scope of this article, that these sections remained 
a source of controversy long after the Committee stage had ended. 
62 House Debates No. 4, supra, note 8 (October 22-23, 1980), at 3948, 4050. 
63 Committee, supra, note 18 (January 12, 1981), at 36:26. 
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continued co-operation of the Committee members came during the 
property rights debate, after which Mr. Epp accused the Liberals and 
NDP of conspiring to defeat any and all Conservative motions. The strain 
was subsequently diminished somewhat when the NDP and 
Conservatives allied together against the Liberals on certain legal rights, 
then diminished further when the Liberals agreed to accept the 
Conservatives’ amendments on sections 14 and 15. Mr. McGrath 
proclaimed that he was “speechless”64 and Conservative MP David 
Crombie jokingly exclaimed, “I am not sure we can take this prosperity 
any longer!”65 
Nevertheless, political gamesmanship was noticeably absent. Despite 
the Conservatives’ accusation, the NDP and Liberals never appeared to 
mount a co-ordinated effort to shut out the Conservatives. The 
Conservatives never attempted to derail the discussions, instead making 
genuine and substantive contributions with a goal to strengthening the 
Charter. Furthermore, it is worth considering that a small degree of 
adversity in a system designed to be adversarial is not necessarily a 
negative thing; to the contrary, pushback by the NDP and Conservatives 
against the Liberals did manage to achieve some important gains for the 
Charter, such as the expansion of equality rights and Aboriginal rights. 
There are a few possible reasons why the Committee was able to 
avoid the stratagems that seem to characterize party politics. First, the 
monumental importance of the Constitution seemed to imbue members 
with a sense of duty and solemnity. Many members acknowledged that 
this was no run-of-the-mill debate, but rather, an historic moment for 
Canada and a humbling experience for those involved in its making. 
Members often described their work as a “duty”, a “responsibility”, and 
an “obligation” owed to the people of Canada. For instance, Liberal MP 
Ron Irwin recalled the members of the caucus reminding him, “we are 
not Liberals going in there; we are Canadians. This is your first 
obligation, not to your party, not to your government, not to the Leaders, 
but to the people of Canada”. That sense of patriotic duty may have 
suppressed some of the urges towards partisan one-upmanship.  
Second, the structure of the Committee itself, with its focus on the 
substance of the Resolution rather than the procedure, seems to have 
distinguished it from debates in the House. While the Conservatives 
continued to bristle against the Liberals’ unilateral decisions in the House, 
                                                                                                                       
64 Committee, id. (January 28, 1981), at 47:89. 
65 Id., at 47:90. 
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the Committee’s work focused on making substantive amendments, 
particularly to the Charter. This was an important distinction, as all three 
parties were aligned on the concept of a strong Charter, and the majority of 
the partisanship arose regarding the method of patriation.66 Mr. Irwin 
expressed this feeling by analogizing it to the flag debate: “[w]e are past the 
point on whether we were going to have a flag or not; we are talking about 
what colour it is going to be or what the sign is going to be. I think that is 
marvellous for Canada.” His sentiments were likely a sliver too optimistic, 
since the Conservatives had not yet conceded the debate on whether there 
would be unilateral patriation in the first place, but, at least within the 
Committee, Mr. Irwin’s analogy was instructive — the members of the 
Committee were not there to debate whether they should have patriation, 
but rather what would be the substance of the constitutional package to be 
patriated. To this end, the strict objectivity and rigid adherence to rules 
displayed by the co-chairmen were also important in keeping the 
Committee focused on its substantive task. Conservative MPs recognized 
that the co-chairmen were largely responsible for setting the deliberative 
tone of the Committee and expressed their gratitude both in the Committee 
and the House.67  
Third, the influence of television cannot be underestimated. Senator 
Austin would later reflect that the public scrutiny created by television 
forced the Committee members to be more thoughtful and reasoned 
policymakers, rather than the shallow showmen that the Liberals had 
initially feared. He recounted: 
The television eye raised the stature of the whole proceedings…. All of 
us began to feel that with the country watching, truly watching, at a 
level that was serious and intimate, we had to be better than we ever 
had been before in bringing forth our own view of things. Well, to be 
better means to think more deeply, to be more careful, to be more 
analytical…. So TV turned out to be the best discipline.68 
The television scrutiny that the Conservatives fought for likely also 
constrained their ability to be obstructionist. It became obvious that the 
people wanted a strong Charter.69 The witnesses who appeared before the 
                                                                                                                       
66 Nathan Nurgitz and Hugh Segal, No Small Measure: The Progressive Conservatives and 
the Constitution (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1983), at 74-75. 
67 See House Debates No. 7, supra, note 20 (March 4, 1981), at 7904 (John Fraser); 
Committee, supra, note 18 (January 9, 1981), at 35:78. 
68 Sheppard and Valpy, supra, note 11, at 142. 
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Committee, by and large, wanted a strong Charter. Deputy Justice 
Minister Roger Tassé would later recall the unexpected boon that 
television coverage presented to the Liberals, boosting public demand, 
not only for a Charter, but for the entire patriation process.70 The 
Conservatives became aware of this public sentiment, and perhaps made 
the strategic decision to restrict the fight over patriation to the House, 
leaving the Committee for substantive debate. 
VI. AFTERMATH 
The draft recommended by the Committee in its report would be 
largely adopted into the final draft of the Charter unchanged. Nevertheless, 
there were a few subsequent changes; for instance, a preamble recognizing 
the “Supremacy of God” was added at the insistence of the Conservatives, 
an ameliorative provision was added to qualify mobility rights, and section 
28 guaranteeing equality for men and women was added thanks to the 
continued advocacy of women’s rights groups. Perhaps the most 
significant addition was section 33, the notwithstanding clause. The clause 
was added as a last compromise between the Liberals and the provinces in 
an attempt to reach a “substantial degree of provincial consent” as required 
by a Supreme Court decision regarding the legality of unilateral patriation, 
rendered on September 28, 1981.71 Section 33 would remain “an enduring 
source of regret” for Trudeau.72 The Constitution Act, 1982, with the 
support of the federal government and every province except Quebec, was 
approved by the United Kingdom Parliament on March 25, 1982 and 
proclaimed in force by Queen Elizabeth II in front of Parliament Hill in 
Ottawa on April 17, 1982.73 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Though now relegated to obscurity, the work of the Committee and its 
contribution to the patriation of the Constitution was very important 
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70 Page, id., at 90; Tassé, supra, note 4, at 267. 
71 Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 
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indeed. Deputy Minister of Justice Roger Tassé, would later reflect that, 
without the public enthusiasm generated by the Committee’s 
proceedings, the patriation of the Constitution in 1982 might well have 
failed entirely, mired in intractable disputes between the federal parties 
and the provinces. The intense public scrutiny breathed new life into the 
patriation debate, and changed the terms of the debate from the oft-
inaccessible subject of federalism to the comprehensible and popular one 
of human rights. Furthermore, the Committee’s work not only resulted in 
an unprecedented and candid role for the public, but also encouraged  
an air of intellectual deliberation among the members of the Committee 
that was reflected in the thoughtful and congenial atmosphere of its 
proceedings. 
However, it is also worth noting that while the Canadian public did 
reap the rewards of this process, both the Liberals and the Conservatives 
succeeded in using the Committee to achieve certain political victories. 
The Conservatives were able to prolong the Committee’s proceedings 
and frustrate the expedited timeline that the Liberals had hoped for, 
ultimately forcing the Liberals to submit to a Supreme Court reference 
and a further round of negotiations with the provinces. The Liberals were 
able to capitalize on populist sentiment for the Charter, allowing them to 
realize a stronger Charter that was more faithful to Trudeau’s initial 
vision and to use the Charter as political leverage in the broader 
patriation debate. 
 
